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Sovereign Immunity Lesson II
I. Introduction and Historical Background
When a court makes a right decision for wrong reasons or reasons incorrectly toward a right conclusion of law - in effect finding
truth by confusion - accolades for the soundness of that decision,
even if the decision seems propitious, are unjustified. In a constitutional context, the potential for correct judicial conclusions for incorrect reasons looms large. An uncertain legislative response, followed
in turn by an endless train of further mistaken judicial reaction to
the legislative response, nurtures advanced confusion. Pennsylvania
has reached such an advanced stage of confusion and uncertainty
over the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Sovereign Immunity Lesson 1P reviewed the law of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania. It included an examination of domestic and
foreign political problems behind the doctrine and a description of
the law/equity problem which burdened that doctrine. Sovereign Immunity Lesson I attempted to demonstrate that the true meaning of
article I Section 11 of the constitution of 1969 was misunderstood by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which had long cited it as the
source for sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania.' The preceding political history, particularly the aversion to chancellors and the traditional hostility to the executive which had conditioned the drafting of
the old constitution in 1790, pointed the way to an entirely new sovereign immunity concept now that this history had been muted by
time. In addition, the rise of both judicial and executive power at the
expense of legislative power in the successive constitutions of 1838
and 1874 required certain adjustments in the new immunity concept,
even though the pertinent words of the constitutions had not
changed. 3
I. Sloan, Lessons in ConstitutionalInterpretation:Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REv. 209 (1978). For the sake of symmetry, this earlier article will be referred to as Sovereign Immunity Lesson I.
2. For cases in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court incorrectly insisted that sovereign immunity had a constitutional base, see Meagher v. Commonwealth, 439 Pa. 532, 266
A.2d 684 (1970); Biello, 454 Pa. 179 (1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d
868 (1973); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 309 A.2d
374 (1973); Zerby v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 464 Pa. 421, 346 A.2d 914
(1975); and French v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa. 558, 370 A.2d 1163 (1977).
3. The language of Article IX Section I I of the constitution of 1790 is substantially
identical to the language of Article I Section 11 of the constitution of 1969. In Cavanaugh v.

II. The Response to Sovereign Immunity Lesson I
A. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, overlooked Sovereign Immunity Lesson I.4 The court ignored its thesis that a proper
understanding of Article I Section 11 provides the governor with
limited immunity in equity but not at law and that such immunity
might rationally be extended, in the last three decades of the twentieth century, to the governor's cabinet. So too, the court ignored its

suggestion that governmental immunity and "high person" and official immunity, although chimeras in 1790, could be understood in
twentieth-century terms to mean no judicial interference with an executive's legal duties or discretionary judgments.5 The court had already rejected governmental immunity in Ayala v. Philadelphia

Board of Education,6 had abandoned confidence in high person immunity, 7 and appeared to disregard official immunity.' The only immunity remaining in Pennsylvania was sovereign immunity.
9 the Pennsylvania
In Mayle v. Department of Transportation,
Supreme court abolished blanket sovereign immunity. Although the

court was correct with regard to the tort suit at hand, it left confusion over its meaning. Was its opinion retroactive? Did the opinion
apply to all suits against the Commonwealth? What role could the

legislature play under the constitution? Questions lingered about official immunities10 and judicially abrogated governmental immunities because both were common law creations. If the legislature

could act for the state to resuscitate sovereign immunity, it might act
for local governments as well. It could also act to protect officials.
These were brooding presences.

Once the court in Mayle admitted that the sovereign immunity
doctrine was a judicial art form, it implied that the legislature could
Davis, 497 Pa. 351, 440 A.2d 380 (1981), the court stated that different constitutional provisions from the same constitution pertaining to the same subject matter should be read as an
integrated whole. The same language in successive constitutions may presumably change
meanings if related sections of an old constitution are removed or altered in successive constitutions. An orthodox view would maintain, however, that the same language carries the same
intent. The author's position is between these two extremes. See supra note I.
4. Although the court cited Sovereign Immunity Lesson I in Mayle v. Pennsylvania
Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 387, 388 A.2d 709, 710 (1978), it ignored the position
presented in that work.
5. See supra note I at 269.
6. Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Education, 452 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
7. See Dubree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540, 393 A.2d 293 (1978), where the court
eliminated per se official immunity which is related to high person, low person conditional, and
qualified immunities.
8. Ibid. High person immunity was formerly a persistent way of discussing or focusing
upon official immunity.
9.

See supra note 4.

10. Dubree v. Commonwealth, see supra note 7, abolished per se official immunity and
left unanswered certain questions about who would continue to enjoy other immunities.

either declare the Commonwealth immune or waive immunity, leaving questions about whether the doctrine is really a command of Article I Section 11 or a common law doctrine. In either case, legislative reaction was destined to be constitutionally faulty, unless the

law/equity distinction was perceived.
This scenario was only tip of the iceberg. If sovereign immunity
had a common law foundation, could the legislature (which had,
under the court's prior interpretations always assumed a constitutionally mandated sovereign immunity) interpret it as imperative?
Could courts suggest some constitutional guidelines in the deluge of

cases which was certain to follow? If the legislature saw sovereign
immunity as a common law doctrine, could it simply declare the
Commonwealth sovereign and immune, or could courts cut back
upon the new declaration as well? The Ayala line of cases was still
correct,1 1 but it could easily suffer more erosion without legislative
abrogation; notwithstanding its wide sweep, courts could limit Ayala

to school boards or shift its focus to dealings with employees of the
mini-sovereign rather than the mini-sovereign itself. 2
B.

The Pennsylvania Legislature
In 1978, the legislature hurriedly responded to this situation

with a misconceived statute" which had been drafted prior to
Mayle. The majority of legislators apparently failed to read Sovereign Immunity Lesson I, because the new statute reaffirmed the sovereign immunity which had never existed, and thus overruled Mayle.
The statute limited the types of tort suits available in the sovereign
immunity context. Because the statute extended sovereign waiver
retroactively to the pre-Mayle period, it suspended some ongoing
lawsuits which Mayle and the constitution had permitted and entirely eliminated some vested rights which had already accrued.

Under the statute, courts could limit the amount of recovery. The
fruits of confusion had created chaos.
II. All cases cited in note 2 were now wrong.
12. Both Ayala and Dubree are correct under a proper understanding of the constitutions of 1790 and 1969. Ayala was, however, already suffering erosion. In Wicks v. Milzoco
Builders, 25 Pa. Commw.. 340, 360 A.2d 250 (1976), owners sued a builder and various township officials for negligence which caused flood damage to the plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs alleged negligence on the part of the officials in enforcing certain township ordinances.
The officials won on immunity grounds because they were either "high" immune officials or
perhaps because they were immune low officials; it doesn't make much difference. Such terminology continues to complement avoidance of governmental and official liability.
13. The Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, which was later repealed. See infra
note 15. For two worthwhile law review comments which point out the oblique reasoning in
Mayle and the difficulties in the statute which followed that opinion, see Comment, The King
Can Do Wrong: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Abolishes Sovereign Immunity, 52 TEMP. L.Q.
842 (1979); and Comment, The Legislature Responds to Mayle: Limited Sovereign Immunity
Reaffirmed, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 854 (1979).

The legislature tried to remedy the confusion. It repealed the
original statute - after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it to
be unconstitutional in part14 - and replaced it with a new statute. 15
This-new statute is still unconstitutional in view of the real meaning
of Article I Section 11 of the constitution of 1790. The statute not
only asserts a sovereign immunity which never existed and then
waives it in certain instances 6 but also carries with it the baggage of
limitation of liability and recovery. 17 It recreates governmental immunity,18 thereby obliterating Ayala, and defines official immunity
in a manner which adds more confusion.
The new statute, nonetheless, deserves admiration for its lucid
draftsmanship. It brings together nearly all the actors and allegedly
immune parties, deeming the latter as either Commonwealth parties
or local government parties. The statute suggests a pattern for drafting a statute which could conform to constitutional requirements. It
demonstrates that a clean statement of both governmental and official immunities, which takes into account the contours of a rational
scheme for immunities, is possible. Such framing of the issues was
needed, even though sovereign and governmental immunities do not
exist from a purist's standpoint. If official immunities are not pure
baggage as some commentators claim, these must be examined
again. The idea of shielding government officials who have policymaking duties might not have met constitutional muster in 1790 but
certainly deserves statutory consideration today. Times have changed
since 1790.19
14.

In effect the court in Gibson v. Commonwealth, 490 Pa. 156, 415 A.2d 80 (1980),

which applied Mayle retroactively, declared unconstitutional only the retroactive assertion of
sovereign immunity applying to actions accruing or arising prior to Mayle. See also Brungard
v. Mansfield State College, 491 Pa. 363, 419 A.2d 1171 (1980).
15. The Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 6013, repealed the Act of November 26, 1978,
P.L. 1399. The Act of October 5, 1980 is now enshrined at 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521 et seq.
(1980) and is hereafter referred to as the Tort Claims Act. Two law review comments dealing
with the Tort Claims Act are Comment, Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act Held Constitutional, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 643 (1982); and Comment, Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel Can Be
Applied Against State, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 920 (1980). The former discusses Carroll v. City of
York, 496 Pa. 363, 437 A.2d 394 (1981); the latter examines the history of equitable estoppel
matters and reaches conclusions to point the way to a "true doctrine."
16. Entities such as the City of Philadelphia and the County of York were neither
sovereign nor immune in 1790. The founding fathers did not even consider Pennsylvania to be
a sovereign, and they certainly did not consider Pennsylvania to be immune. See generally
Sovereign Immunity Lesson I, supra note 1.
17. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8528, 8853 (Purdon 1980).
18. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8541 (Purdon 1980). High officials, low officials, persons
with conditional immunity, and sovereign agencies and instrumentalities now possess "official
immunity."
19. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8545-50 (Purdon 1980). In Sovereign Immunity Lesson
I, Sloan, Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation: Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82
DICK. L. REV. 209, 211-18 (1978), the author claimed that high person, low person, and official immunities were the same. They were simply, along with conditional immunity and qualified immunity, different routes toward forcing plaintiffs to lose. If an official is protected, however, and his principal, the sovereign, is held responsible for his torts, there is a need to

III.

The Origin and Scope of Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania

When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abandoned the longstanding common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, it gave the
legislature no guidance as to the constitutional pattern of immunities
and, as the dissent in Mayle pointed out, left for itself no standard of
measurement. This is precisely the tack which the legislature
adopted on two occasions. By reaffirming, perhaps as an expression
of public policy or as a claim to the world that the Commonwealth is
still a sovereign against all people except when sovereign waiver is
implemented, the legislature has assumed that which never existed
- total immunity. Since the legislature has gone further and established tiny subsovereigns across the state, the problem is more severe. No one is certain where this mini-sovereignty came from either. Did it derive from common law or from Article I Section 11?
Does it now make any difference?
Mayle went from one extreme ("no actions against the Commonwealth") to another ("it's open season"). The legislature sought
a middle ground but chose the wrong middle ground. One commentator criticized Mr. Justice Robert's decision in Mayle by siating,
"From a reading of that portion of the constitution it does not appear that the court has the power to abrogate the doctrine but that
sovereign immunity is a constitutional privilege." 20 This simplistic
view is rational if there is no standard. The standard, however, is
supplied by the constitution. It is a simple standard - "Lawsuits are
OK; equity suits are not." That is a proper middle ground.
This conclusion emanates from the drafting objectives of framers of the constitution of 1790.21 An immunity in equity only was
given to the governor alone because the founding fathers of Pennsylvania wanted a stronger executive than existed under the preceding
post-1776 period. The new governor was a compromise between an
autocratic king and the weak executive council of recent (17761790) Pennsylvania history. This governor was "vested" with no "supreme" power as was the legislature. He was given the right to execute laws passed by the legislature and was expected to use his discretion within those confines. In the original scheme of 1776-1790,
the executive council had no immunity. This was evidently a reaction
to kingly power which was an anathema. Although legislators had
describe an official, personal immunity only in those cases between master and servant under
respondeat superior principles, where there may be questions as to whether an official acted
properly or within the scope of his employment. These immunities were baggage under a strict
reading of the constitution of 1790, but they might deserve implementation today because they
are rational.
20. Comment, The King Can Do Wrong: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Abolishes Sovereign Immunity, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 842, 851 (1979).
21. For a discussion of these drafting objectives, see supra note 1.

constitutional immunity and judges had common law immunity, the

constitution of 1790 limited the governor's immunity to an equitable
immunity because such immunity was in accord with Pennsylvania
traditions formulated 150 years earlier. A recognition of these histor-

ical developments is important because they laid a foundation for an
understanding of future developments in Pennsylvania of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The new pattern was to have a supreme
legislature, a strong governor and weak courts. The-people were to

have access to the courts even against the governor at law but not in
equity and the courts were given only very limited chancery powers.
This pattern produced the governor's equitable immunity.
A. Prescriptionsof the Original Constitution;Requirements of the
New
The equitable immunity provision of the original Pennsylvania
Constitution has been incorporated into succeeding constitutions.
However, the eighteenth century terminology employed by the
founding fathers had a special meaning. A scrupulous analysis of the
constitutional language from a historical perspective provides a clear
understanding of the drafters' original intent. This analysis demonstrates that the common law and statutory development of immunity
in Pennsylvania has been misguided.22
Article I Section 11 of the present Pennsylvania Constitution
provides:
All courts shall be open, and every man for an injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy
by the due course of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the
Commonwealth in such manner, in such 23courts and in such
cases as the legislature may be law direct.
The language "Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth"
grants a right to the public-access to the courts. The remaining
language in that sentence creates a limitation on that right. That
limiting language means that the legislature must state affirmatively
the cases (in equity) in which immunity of the executive may be
changed or, if you will, the legislature must state when and where
the new immunity exists. 4
22.

See Carroll v. City of York, 496 Pa. 3673, 437 A.2d 394 (1981); Mayle v. Dept. of

Transportation, 490 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1979); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 490 Pa. 156,
415 A.2d 80 (1980); Merchants Warehouse Co. v. Gelder, 349 Pa. 1, 36 A.2d 444 (1944);
Collins v. Commonwealth, 62 Pa. 572, 106 A. 229 (1919); John Black v. Rempublicam, I
Yeates 139 (Pa. 1792); Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788).
23. PA. CONST. of 1969, art. 1, § 11. The same provision appears in the PA. CoNsT. of
1790, art IX § 11.
24.

Sloan, Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation:Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylva-

Two legal conclusions follow from this interpretation. First, the
Commonwealth is not immune from tort liability, nor is the Commonwealth a totally immune sovereign. Second, the limitation, as ar-

ticulated in the original Pennsylvania constitution, assumed an immunity in equity cases only. This equitable immunity was limited to
the governor only. When one understands that the words used by the
original drafters were terms of art, the validity of these conclusions
becomes apparent.25
Historically, there were two meanings for the word "suits".
"Suits" referred to suits in equity and to petitions of right (which
had been made originally to the crown and later to the legislature). 26
However, a third possible meaning exists for the word "suits". A
generic meaning covering all law and equity suits (but not petitions

of right) is feasible. In attributing a generic meaning to the word

"suits" the command of the provision becomes: The legislature must

say in which manner, in which courts and in which cases these generic suits may be brought against the Commonwealth. This means
that the legislature may define in which manner, in which courts and
in which cases, law or equity suits against the Commonwealth can be
maintained. However, this reasoning attributes the same meaning to
both "cases" and "suits". But such reasoning violates the accepted
rules of drafting and statutory construction because "cases" dealt

with actions at law in 1790 and "suits" referred to equity matters
only.
If the term "suits" simply means any kind of law or equity proceeding, then the meaning of the term "manner"27 in conjunction
with Article V, § 628 of the original constitution clearly indicates
that equity suits against the Commonwealth can only be maintained
nia, 82 DICK. L. REv. 209, 220 (Winter 1978).
25. Id. at 239-243.
26. Id. at 242-245.
27. As pointed out in Sovereign Immunity Lesson I, if "manner" means "how" a lawsuit of a given type can be brought, then "manner" is redundant. Stating where and in which
cases a generic suit can be brought disposes of the matter completely. "Manner" must refer to
modes of procedure. The phrase "in which court and in which cases" already addresses two of
the modes of procedure in the grant of jurisdiction. Thus, manner must include something that
is missing in the grant of jurisdiction. Clearly, "manner" refers to the details that are essential
to common law pleading i.e., the kind of papers to be filed, the time parameters, by whom a
writ was to be served etc.
28. PA. CONST. of 1790, art V, § 6 provides:
The Supreme Court and the several courts of common pleas shall, beside
the power heretofore usually exercised by them, have the power of a court of
chancery, so far as related to the perpetuating of testimony, the obtaining of
evidence from places not within the state and the care of persons and estates of
those who are non compos mentis. And the legislature shall vest in the said
courts such other powers to grant relief in equity as shall be found necessary;
and may, from time to time, enlarge or diminish those powers, or vest them in
such other courts, as they shall judge proper for the due administration of
justice.

if and-when the legislature permits them. This construction harmonizes Article IX of the original constitution with the other provisions,
particularly Article V which establishes and limits the power of the
Pennsylvania courts in equitable matters. Assuming the existence of
sovereign immunity, the legislature may describe the kinds of generic suits which can be filed, as well as the "manner", "courts" and
"cases" for the filing.
While emphasizing the nonliability of the Commonwealth to equity suits, this generic meaning of "suits" seems to leave the problem
of petitions of right unresolved. However, the second sentence of the
provision states that the legislature may delegate its power to act
upon petitions of right. This constitutional provision does not say
that citizens must bring law or equity actions when the legislature
has acted. Instead, citizens may bring such suits, in such "manner"
and in such courts and cases as the legislature determines.
Since the legislature could delegate the function of passing on
petitions of right to the court, clearly this sentence does not provide
for Commonwealth immunity in all cases of law and equity. Immunity may exist in some matters. But the old constitution eliminated
most of the court's equitable jurisdiction vis-a-vis the non-immune at
law executive. The only immunity developed out of the perceived
need to prevent interference with the governor's exercise of executive
discretion or non-ministerial duty was an equitable immunity.
If Article IX, Section 11 of the original Pennsylvania Constitution did not stand for the proposition that the Commonwealth is an
immune sovereign, what did it say? It says that the Commonwealth
is an immune sovereign in equity only and that this immunity may
be waived in certain kinds of suits. It says that the legislature may,
but need not, take some sort of affirmative action.
The constitutions of 1874 and 1969 accompanied the progressive reorganization of judicial power. Under this reorganization the
courts more freely share power with the other governmental
branches than they had in 1790. The most significant new power,
since 1790, now residing in the courts is the power to interpret the
constitution. This power is, in actuality, a judicial law-making
power, which may be selectively exercised without the consent of the
legislature.
Under the constitution of 1969, the Supreme Court of Pa. may,
in the absence of state congressional action, specify the particulars
regarding "manner", "court" and "case" in which the Commonwealth can be sued. The Supreme Court as a matter of common law
speaks in this way because Article V, § 6 of the original constitution

does not appear in the constitution of 1969.29 The limitations on the
equity powers of the court no longer exist, except as incorporated
under Article I, § 11.1*
Arguably, in the absence of a provision in the 1969 constitution
similar to Article V, § 6 of the original constitution, the Supreme
Court is now vested with supreme judicial power and citizens are
now given full access to the courts. The single exception arises in the
immunity context regarding those matters still cognizable in equity.
A new supreme court, now vested with supreme judicial power,
could abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity or determine the
contours of immunity if it understood the law/equity problem.
The common-law nature of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in Pennsylvania can readily be demonstrated.31 English sovereignty,
with its attribute of immunity passed to either the United States or
Pennsylvania or to both. If it came to Pennsylvania, it did so by way
of English common law in which judicial immunity was assured.
Legislative immunity was specifically given in the original constitution. Therefore, any kind of executive immunity which existed in
1790 in Pennsylvania had to be: (a) in existence at common law or,
(b) prescribed in the original constitution.
The English king, as executive, was immune at law but not in
equity. This scheme was thought to be inadequate in view of the
Pennsylvania traditions of a weak executive and a hostility to courts
of Chancery in which writs were "sold, denied or delayed." Additionally, the limited equity powers of law courts under the close supervision of the legislature in 1790 stressed the need for a stronger
executive protected from courts with selected equity powers. Article
IX, Section 11 in conjunction with Article V, § 6 of the original
constitution created this new pattern.
These provisions proved that there was no immune sovereign in
Pennsylvania except in equity and that this immunity only applied to
the governor. The right granted by these provisions, as well as the
limitation on that right, were not permanent. Immunity could be extended to the governor's agents by a later law or constitution. Immunity could also be curtailed in the same fashion. Immunity at law did
not exist, unless the legislature exercised its plenary power and declared otherwise. 2
29.
CONST.

By accident or design, the PA. CONST. of 1969 lacks any parallel provision to PA.

of 1790, art V, § 6. See generally, Sloan, Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation:

Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania, 82 DiCK. L. REV. 209, notes 55, 107, 175 and accompanying text (Winter 1978).
30. See generally Sloan, Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation:' Sovereign Immunity
in Pennsylvania, 82 DIcK. L. REV. 209 (Winter 1978).
31. Id. at 262-267.
32. In the modern context, of course, such a legislative declaration would be subject to
judicial review. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 470 (1807).

Commonwealth immunity at law was not mandated by the original constitution nor by the 1969 constitution. Under either constitution a blanket Commonwealth immunity at law would be void."
However, complex questions remain to be answered. First, if the
original constitution did not provide for immunity at law and the
1969 constitution uses the same words, are legal immunities valid in
1985? Second, is the Pennsylvania Tort Claims' Act 4 defective because it fails to waive immunity in suits for breach of contract?
Third, if the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act confers immunity at law
on political subdivisions, does it irrationally eliminate all recourse for
too many people? Finally, is the original prohibition against equity
suits without legislative consent still a rational classification?
In resolving these questions, it must be noted that Article 1, section 9 of the 1969 constitution uses the same words as the original
constitutional provision. Thus, the interpretation of Article I, § 9
similarly to the proper interpretation of the original provision is required, unless the two constitutions are different. These two constitutions of 1790 and 1969 are different. The 1969 constitution contains
no equitable limitation upon the courts. The original prohibition
against equity suits in 1790 must be tempered with the reality of an
expanding judicial role in modern times.
B. The Meaning of the New Trilogy and the Tort Claims Act in
View of the New Constitutional Standards
The new Tort Claims Act overturns Mayle v. Pa. Dept. of
Highways.3 5 Mayle was made retroactive by Gibson v. Commonwealth,36 which reinstated governmental immunity and which should
have reversed a lot of cases. The Act also clearly defines official immunity and governmental immunity. Carroll v. City of York3 7 validates the new statutory base for governmental immunity and overturns Ayala v. PhiladelphiaBoard of Education,8 the only sensible
old case. Carrollalso tells us that the new law has a rational classification scheme.
Carrollcreates, in effect (not without a vigorous dissent, which
seems to understand that governmental immunity creates official immunity, which creates conditional immunity, and so forth), judicial
recognition of the mini-sovereign. This new sovereign, however, is
33. Under PA. CONST. of 1790, a blanket sovereign immunity at law would have been
void if, pre Marbury v. Madison, there was a court able to make such a declaration. Under the
PA. CONST. of 1969, a blanket immunity of any kind would be void.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. 4651-1 et seq.
35. 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
36. 490 Pa. 156, 415 A.2d 80 (1980).
37. 496 Pa. 363, 437 A.2d 394 (1981).
38. Supra note-6.

not so inferior that its interests can be destroyed by legislative whim
as in the old days. It 30is a full-fledged partner in the new society of
Pennsylvania Princes.

The lower courts and the supreme court are dealing with the
debris of right conclusions for wrong reasons because the legislature
has spoken after the high court ruled without guidance, and the
courts remain confused. For example, the supreme court has permitted an injunction and awarded damages against a sovereign under its
own state civil rights law.40 Meanwhile, other courts are forbidding
legitimate lawsuits because they do not fit within the limitations of
the new statute. For example, in Smith v. Lancaster County Tax
Claim Bureau," a tax bureau was held immune from suit or from
liability for loss of a mortgage interest following a tax sale of a real
estate interest; the court found that the county did not "control" the
interest. In Wunsch v. City of Erie,'2 it was held that an insurance
company could not subrogate against a municipality. Both cases interpreted the new Tort Claims Act strictly.
The new statute, with its eight categories of state and local tort
liability, also defines the official immunities of the little sovereign's
officers, much as such immunities might have been defined for the
governor in 1790. The result, however, is not terribly sensible. Now,
employees who hold supervisory or other white collar positions in a
subsovereign's office are immunized,'43 while other white collar workers who may have supervised the infliction of damage, such as engineers, strangely become responsible, perhaps because they work in
coveralls on a project.""
The cases and the statute are, of course, totally wrong. The
cases themselves are scattered, sometimes erroneous, and never
clear. They present governmental or sovereign immunity problems,
law and equity problems, and perhaps what one might call domestic
equal protection problems. These issues should be examined briefly,
although no Pennsylvania case has ever addressed the law/equity
problem and few cases have found an equal protection problem emanating from the immunity patchwork.
1. Sovereign Governmental Immunity.-We are told by vari39. See notes referred to at note 15 supra, especially the second of these.
40. Fisher v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 497 Pa. 267, 439 A.2d 1172 (1982). The court's
action is proper today because the court now has the necessary intervention power. Under the
constitution of 1790, however, the court could not grant the injunction. See also Mansfield
State College v. Kovicks, 407 A.2d 1388 (1979).
41. 23 Pa. D & C 3d 734 (1982).
42. 25 Pa. D & C 3d 742 (1981).
43. In re Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 406 A.2d 1355 (1979).
44. Cerino v. Twp. of Palmer, 265 Pa. Super. 1, 401 A.2d 770 (1979) held that the
engineer for a township of the second class is not a policy maker.

ous courts, without consideration of history, that the Tort Claims
Act is not unconstitutional, even though an invalid provision is
stricken from the statute that contains no severability clause." We
are also told that the Act is not violative of the rational scheme
idea,"' and that it requires strict construction.47 We have been advised that the statute would square with the constitution even if governmental immunity were made retroactive." The result is that, in
the old pre-Mayle way, some people win and some people lose in an
arbitrary, flip-of-the-coin manner which makes no sense at all. 49
Since the courts are not seeing the law/equity problems, they can
only work within the procrustean limits of the new statute. 50
For example, if one is directed by state highway personnel to
drive a fifteen foot high truck over a bridge with a fourteen foot
clearance, and truck and bridge are damaged, neither the bridge nor
the truck are within the eight categories of things for which one can

sue the state in tort, so the injured party loses. 5 1 If, however, a nonstate employee throws rocks onto a person's car from a bridge over a
state highway,52 or if a state sign falls on someone who happens to
be on a state highway, the injured party may bring suit against the
state. 53 Presumably, either the rock and the sign are considered
state-owned personal property, or the rock (or the rock-thrower) and
the sign are considered dangerous conditions. State police officers
can beat you up, 54 children in the charge of the state can assault
you, 55 escaped prisoners can rob you" or murder you, 57 and you can-

not successfully sue the state, unless, before you were beaten up,
raped, robbed, or killed, you happen to have been bitten by a stateowned horse. Strict construction of the statute is simply another way

of ignoring the constitution. Indeed the state or its functionaries can

even deliberately invade everyman's rights with immunity.5 8 Every-

man loses in violation of his right to recourse given in the original
45.

Gibson and Carroll supra notes 14, 15 managed this feat.

46. Picariello v. Commonwealth, 54 Pa. Cmwlth. 252, 421 A.2d 477 (1980).
47. All cases strictly construing the statute reason that strict construction is required
because the statute derogates from the common law and sovereign immunity.
48. Brungard v. Hartman, 394 A.2d 1265 43 Pa. 200 on remand, 46 Pa. Cmwlth 10,
405 A.2d 1089 (1979).
49. Some cases, such as Brungard v. Mansfield State College, have been reversed. 491

Pa. 114, 419 A.2d 1171 (1980). The reasoning in reversing opinions, however, lacks clarity.
50. See notes 40 to 49 supra and 51-60 and 63 infra and the text accompanying these.
51. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Ingersol Rand Corp., 147 Pa. Cmwlth. 304, 408 A.2d
183 (1979).

52.

Misteka v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. Cmwlth. 269, 408 A.2d 59 (1979).

53. Learner v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. Cmwlth. 460, 406 A.2d 844 (1979).
54. Borosky v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. Cmwlth. 252, 406 A.2d 256 (1979).
55. Steinburg v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 46 Pa. Cmwlth. 105, 405 A.2d 1135 (1979).
56. Reiff v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. Cmwlth. 335, 406 A.2d 1176 (1979).
57. Estate of Armstrong v. pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 46 Pa. Cmwlth. 33, 405
A.2d 1099 (1979).
58. Garretson v. Pa. Liquor Control Board, 46Pa. Cmwlth. 136, 405 A.2d 1147 (1979).

constitutional words.
To show how crudely these matters have been thought through,
another case should be considered. In Kastner v. Commonwealth,5 9
Kastner had filed a suit in trespass against the Commonwealth. The
commonwealth court dismissed the suit on the basis of the Commonwealth's preliminary objections (based on sovereign immunity).
While an appeal to the supreme court was pending, Mayle was issued and the first tort claims statute was passed. The supreme court
remanded the case to the commonwealth court so it could reconsider
its decision in view of Mayle. The commonwealth court held that
Kastner had no vested right to sue the state, and dismissed the case
because the Tort Claims Act executed the cause of action. In Kastner, a vested right was snuffed out and justice was "denied and
delayed" to everyman.
The commonwealth court did not see a vested right in Kastner
because it assumed that sovereign immunity was a common law
creature; the legislature in passing the statute, however, thought that
sovereign immunity was constitutionally required, and thus retained
sovereign immunity. Yet, the courts strictly interpret the statute in
such cases because it derogates from the common law without seeing
any inconsistency in their reasoning. At the same time, the legislature knows that, for subsovereigns, the whole structure of immunity
was judicially created and then abrogated. Inconsistently, the legislature now assumes that the subsovereign's immunity also has a constitutional base. The courts then assume that the legislature can constitutionally claim immunity simply by changing a law. The courts will
then strictly construe the new law or assume that it is constitutionally mandated. Clearly, neither the courts nor the legislature have
sorted through the matter. The idea is made clear by examining a
few curious law/equity cases.
2. Law/Equity Problems.-InSherbick v. Community College
of Allegheny County,"0 the plaintiff was allowed to continue to proceed in equity because his pre-Mayle action survived Mayle. The
commonwealth court held that Gibson required Mayle to be applied
retroactively, the Tort Claims Act, however, was not to be applied
retroactively. Thus, any complaint pending in the courts at the time
of Mayle should be free from the subsequently evolved defense of
sovereign immunity. This result is precisely correct and is precisely
the opposite of the holding in Kastner. If the court had looked
59. Kastner, 46 Pas. Cmwlth. 97, 405 A.2d 1133 (1979). It does not matter that later
decisions may negate such erroneous decisions. If such "right" decisions ignore the constitution, no accurate doctrine will exist and more badly reasoned cases will follow.
60. 53 Pa. Cmwlth. 458, 418 A.2d 791 (1980).

closely, it would have seen that Sherbick's action survived only because Mayle did not preclude equity cases (as it should have done).
Reason would suggest that Mayle eliminated all sovereign immunity and applied to all cases initiated before the new statute was
passed and that the new statute could not affect those cases. As indicated before, however, it was not that simple. Mayle was unconstitutional because it permitted all equity suits as well as all law suits.
The supreme court went from "no suits" to "any suits" without understanding the classic 1790 difference between "actions" and
"suits."
The Mayle court, ignoring the 1969 constitution which permitted every type of law suit but no equity suits, permitted the legislature to claim legal immunity and equitable immunity. Because the
new statute decrees that the Commonwealth may be sued (using
"sued" or "suit" in the modern sense) only in eight types of tort
actions, the legislature could also reclaim immunities for the little
sovereigns which were never dreamed of in 1790. According to this
wisdom, the courts and the supreme court are still left with some old
cases, some bad constitutional reading, and the need for some new
and correct doctrine.
Sherbick was partially right for the wrong reasons. The
Sherbick court held that Mayle was retroactive and that the new
categories of governmental immunity created by the statute could
not be applied retroactively to bar the action. Insofar as the action
was for damages, this result was proper under the 1790 constitution
and the present constitution. Insofar as the action was equitable, it
was wrong by 1790 standards, but possibly correct by today's standards because equitable power is no longer feared, and equity damages are similar to damages in law.
Into this miasma slips Borough of Jefferson v. Century III Associates,61 an almost correct decision which implies that a suit to
restrain or compel performance of certain affirmative acts by the executive does not fall within the eight categories provided in the statute and is therefore improper. The statute, insofar as it immunizes
legally required duties or discretionary actions of the executive, is
perfectly in accord with the 1790 and 1969 constitutional schemes
for the executive branch of the large sovereign.
Jefferson is proper not because of its enforcement or strict construction of the eight categories of sin found in the Tort Claims Act
-

they are wrong -

but Jefferson is correct in dictum because it

suggests that judicial interference with executive discretion is in
most cases not permissible.
61.

Pa. Cmwlth. 94, 430 A.2d 1040 (1981), vacated on other grounds.

In Jefferson, the plaintiff, a mini-sovereign, had made a claim
against two Commonwealth agencies as well as against some individual and corporate entities. The Commonwealth defendants were dismissed from the action as immune parties. The court, in its confusion, did add in a footnote that mandamus would lie to require the
performance of ministerial duties which were no longer involved in
the case. Doctrine and dicta are again confusing.
Another group of cases has been decided, correctly or incorrectly, by the courts without any awareness of the real problems inherent in their new sovereign immunity law. The decisions are seemingly without any awareness of the law/equity distinction that was
fundamental in 1790 and is still crucial under the constitution of
1969. These cases, however, suggest the contours of a reasonable
twentieth century reading of the eighteenth century words. But optimism may be unwarranted, because the deciding courts seem to be
groping rather tentatively toward sensible doctrines.
2 had suggested that equitable esErwin v. City of Pittsburgh"
toppel or laches might be validly claimed against a mini-sovereign.
The doctrine of estoppel by laches was seen again in dictum in another case.63 Then, in Department of Public Welfare v. UEC,6" the
high court concluded that the doctrine of equitable estoppel might be
used generally against the Commonwealth. The court noted that the
grounds for claiming that the Commonwealth should not be subject
to the defense of equitable estoppel were substantially the same as
those used by the Commonwealth in preliminary objections claiming
sovereign immunity. Finally, in Department of Revenue Bureau of
Sales and Use Tax v. King Crown Corp.," the Commonwealth was
not permitted to repudiate its agreement with petitioner to have petitioner begin making partial payments of delinquent taxes after the
Commonwealth had begun to accept installment payments pursuant
to a settlement agreement and in violation of the agency's own rules.
In 1790 terms, the equitable defense was really a legal defense;
where the Commonwealth was the plaintiff, everyone ought to be
able to offer legal, sic equitable, defenses against it. The estoppel
cases make sense. However, in the nimbus between law and equity
and equal protection is a procedural problem which puzzles the unwary and mystifies the cognoscienti. In Sovereign Immunity Lesson
I, a footnote suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
evidently adopted an international law standard for its great sover62. 339 Pa. 241, 14 A.2d 297 (1940). See also Corn. ex rel. Margitti v. Union Traction
Co. of Philadelphia, 327 Pa. 497, 194 A. 661 (1937), which spoke of estoppel by laches.
63. Central Dauphin School District v. Dept. of Education, 63 Pa. Cmwlth. 48, 437
A.2d 527 (1981).
64. UEC, 397 A.2d 779 (1979).
65. 52 Pa. Cmwlth. 156, 415 A.2d 927 (1980).

eign. 66 The note and the accompanying text pointed out that one way
of insuring that everyman would lose most immunity suits involved
the procedural morass which divided among different courts cases
involving certain activities of the sovereign and his agents. Now,
under the new law, resolution after Mayle, Gibson, and Carroll becomes a question of which court can handle which part of which law
suit. Again, some people win, but most people lose in a rather complicated fashion. It seems that the combination of Gibson, the Tort
Claims Act, an amendment to the Judicial Code, and continuing dependence on the forms of action may permit an occasional claim
against the Commonwealth to enter the back door by applying the
international law standard to at least the big sovereign. This means
that if the sovereign sues, he may waive his immunity. Most claims
in tort, however, will simply take a bit longer for the plaintiff to lose,
and such back door cases will be rare.
In Commonwealth v. Mastrippolito & Sons,6 7 the plaintiff, a
Commonwealth agency, had requested a declaratory judgment. The
defendant asserted a counterclaim alleging that state agents had deprived the defendant of equal protection and denied it due process by
committing a willful and malicious trespass upon defendant's business premises in the course of their activities. The counterclaim was
of the Commonwealth. The
heard, notwithstanding the objection
68
reasoning of the court was striking:
By reason of § 761a(1) of the Judicial Code. 42 Pa.C.S. 761 we
are constrained to transfer employer's counterclaim in trespass
for an original jurisdiction proceedings to the Court of common
pleas . . . This was because as amended 42 Pa.C.S. 761(c)(1)
pertinently provides that the commonwealth court shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings in trespass
as to which the commonwealth government formally enjoyed
sovereign or other immunity. (emphasis added)
Thus, the commonwealth court cannot hear a counterclaim where
the Commonwealth had been quondam immune, but must now
transfer the claim to another court, which will dismiss it if it falls
outside the eight categories.
The outcome of this type of case will often depend on the status
of plaintiff and defendant and the nature of the claim and counterclaim; do they sound in tort? in contract?; or in both? or do they
sound in the nature of enforcement of a claimed obligation to the
Commonwealth? or in equity, because ancillary relief, such as discovery, is demanded by a claimant?
66. See supra note I at 213, n. 12.
67. Mastripolito, 462 A.2d 338 (1983).
68. Id. at 462 A.2d at 340.

Most claims are in tort or in contract. Some are not so simple.
If a plaintiff pleads in the alternative, or a defendant responds to a
contract claim with a tort claim, how are these actions to be handled? It is easy to say that contract claims go to the Board of Claims
and tort claims go to the court of common pleas. But how does one
characterize a claim for a refund? If the state keeps overpayment or
overassessment of fees and charges, is the state unjustly enriched,
thus characterizing the plaintiff's claim as quasi contractual? Or is it
a breach of contract? Or is the retention of the monies a tort? If the
state's act is called a tort, the plaintiff will go to common pleas
court, and the claim will be dismissed because the claim does not fit
within the eight categories. If the action is considered quasi contractual, however, the claimant may win on what could in reality be
called a tort claim at the Board of Claims which only deals with
contracts.
Given the proper set of facts, as indicated above, a bizarre result could occur. Pechner Dorfman v. Pennsylvania Insurance
Dept. 9 is close enough to the bizarre possibility to merit discussion.
In this case, the claims arose out of the Insurance Commissioner's
practice of charging coal haulers the same premiums for Black Lung
disease coverage as it charged coal extractors. The coal haulers believed that they had been overcharged under the law for nearly a
decade, and they sought - call it what you will, contract overpayments, recoupment, or money wrongfully withheld. They also sought
discovery of records going back over nearly a decade to help them
determine the precise nature and amount of their claim. Transfer of
the tort claim to common pleas court would produce one result,
transfer of the contract claim to the Board of Claims would produce
a different result. To which court should the request for discovery
go? The Board of Claims is not equipped for discovery. The common
pleas court has jurisdiction under § 761(a) of the judicial Code only
where the claim was once the subject of a sovereign immunity defense. If the action was sent to common pleas court for discovery and
was deemed contractual, it would then be sent to the Board of
Claims. If it was deemed a tort action, it would be dismissed. Before
discovery, the plaintiff could not accurately characterize its claim.
The commonwealth court saw this case as ripe for transfer to common pleas court, thus, the plaintiff would eventually lose. One wonders what the result would have been if the claim had been a counterclaim to the Commonwealth's claim for higher Black Lung
disease premiums or to collect unpaid back premium payments.
It would be simple for the court and the legislature to designate
69.

499 Pa. 139, 452 A.2d 230 (1983).

one agency or court to take original jurisdiction for all claims filed
by a citizen against the Commonwealth and for all claims filed by
the Commonwealth against a citizen. The faux "medievil" texts offered in the Epilogue offer ideas for a new plan which would be
wiser and simpler than the present plan.
3. Pennsylvania Equal Protection as Seen Through Governmental and Official Immunity Lenses.-Although Article I of the
1969 Constitution has nothing resembling an equal protection clause,
the question of governmental immunity in relation to the Tort
Claims Act, is actually an equal protection problem. In actions challenging the Act, courts have analyzed the case much as they would if
it were contended that the law violated federal equal protection criteria. However, since New Orleans v. Dukes70 and Mass. Board of
Retirement v. Murgia71 that avenue of attack on sovereign immunity
has promised negligible results.
In Dukes 2 and Murgia," the United States Supreme Court, in
effect declared that, unless a federally cognizable right is threatened
(free speech, for example) or unless the defined group being legislated against is entitled to special protection so that a suspect classification could be argued, the state's definition of a rational scheme is
presumptively correct. Thus, if the state classification scheme is
found to be facially legitimate, it will stand, unless the plaintiff demonstrates its total illegitimacy. This is much like a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
When looking at governmental immunity, as opposed to sovereign immunity, a reasonable classification argument has a very modest chance of striking home, if only because the court must concede
that governmental immunity was a judicial creation which had been
abolished in Ayala for state equal protection reasons. Equal protection was not mentioned in Ayala, but what else could have been
meant? Ayala, however, was before the legislature fell in love with
the idea of creating many minisovereigns each of which would enjoy
its own immunity.
The only apparent purpose behind the Tort Claims Act is fiscal
protection. Under the facially legitimate test, if that purpose can be
70. 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 49 Led 2nd 511 (1976).
71. 427 U.S. 307 96 S. Ct. 2562 49 Led 2nd 520 (1976).
72. The city fathers in Dukes removed vending stands from the French Quarter but
included a grandfather clause for two long established vendors. The Court upheld the clause
because maintaining the appearance and customs of the French Quarter which enhanced tourism was a valid purpose.
73. The Court upheld the state's mandatory retirement of uniformed state police officers at age 50. The state required officers to pass an annual physical examination from age
40 to 50. Although the plaintiff had been declared fit, the court enforced his involuntary
retirement.

seen, the scheme is valid. If no purpose can be seen by the courts,
then the scheme will violate equal protection. If one were to judge
local equal protection by the facially legitimate test (and there is no
reason to suspect that the high court majority would not use such a
hard standard) the Tort Claims Act might fail for the reasons cited
in Ayala.
There is no risk to the fisc in contract because of the Board of
Claims Act, and the major tort risks (auto accidents and highway or
street defects) can be insured against. The ability to insure against
liability is the best reason to eliminate sovereign immunity, aside
from the fact that it is unmanageable and fundamentally unfair.
Large numbers of important economic rights are founded in the
1980's upon the ability of local governments to respond to suits for
damages by local people. Since in nearly all cases the liability can be
insured against, there is even less reason to immunize all Commonwealth agencies, and local schools, zoning boards, taxing authorities
and the like with a blanket immunity in their operations as opposed
to their property ownership. Indeed, in Ayala and Mayle the purpose
of protecting the fisc (the big fisc and all the little fiscs) has already
been rejected.
The Tort Claims Act waives immunity for eight very specific
areas only; this only makes the Act constitutionally suspect. If the
categories for which the demisovereigns can be liable are restricted,
equal protection requires the restrictive categories to follow a facially
rational plan when compared to the eight categories pointing to state
liability and among themselves. It is, therefore, tempting to consider
the state of the law before Ayala and in the interim between Ayala
and Mayle with the post Ayala-Mayle law. Before Ayala, there was
an immune sovereign and an immune demisovereign. After Ayala,
the sovereign remained immune, but the demisovereign, doing the
same governmental work, was not. The post Ayala-Mayle scheme is
not much different than the pre Ayala law. Now, there is a partially
immune sovereign and a more completely immune demisovereign,
and they are still doing the same work. Since pre-Ayala and interim
cases found a nonrational scheme, the new scheme should fare no
better.
It is clear that the old schema were defective. Identical behavior
of two different levels of government gave rise to contrary decisions.74 The big sovereign could be mulcted for damages or ejected
from property that it or its tenant occupied if it intervened in a case
74. See Shapirto v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), for general equal protection criteria prior to 1976. But cf. New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) and Murcia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) for the most recent statement on this
question.

because an intervener waived immunity, 75 and there did not seem to
be a comparable waiver possible for little interveners if they existed.

After Ayala again, the part of the subsovereign, or the subsovereign
itself, could be sued, but not the whole or big sovereign 76 whose parts
could sometimes be sued."
In the pre-Mayle period the high court was on two sides of
nearly every immunity issue. This made its equal protection analysis

at best illusive, at worst speculative, and in reality a phantasma.
Thus, liability against any sovereign had to rise out of an action
which was ministerial, not discretionary;7 s against an official who
was "low" but not "high", (and the same kinds of people were often
high or low79); malicious and not negligent; 80 who was dealing with
property, not people; 81 and who was doing business, rather than gov-

erning.82 Sovereigns nearly always won; people nearly always lost.
The post-Mayle lack of reality holds just as firmly under the

new Tort Claims Act. Some big sovereign possessions (highways)
and "proprietary" activities (selling booze to people) are not immune, while other activities (policing) are immune. Similarly, some
little sovereign possessions (schools) and "proprietary" activities
75. Bannard v. New York State Gas Corp. 404 Pa. 269, 1872 A.2d 306 (1969) concerns ejectment against sovereign's tenant and interprets Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 145. This
case seems to apply an international law standard to a sovereign. See also Gitlin v. Turnpike
Commission, 384 Pa. 326, 121 A.2d 99 (1956) damages paid by Commonwealth for delay in
condemnation proceedings.
76. Ayala and Brown were both decided on the same day.
77. Notwithstanding some tortured reasoning by the court, Specter v. Commonwealth,
462 Pa. 474, 341 A.2d 481 (1975) reverses Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 407
Pa. 609, 82 A.2d 199 (1962) and permits a part of the big sovereign to be sued. Both cases
involved traffic accidents on the turnpike. Rader found the turnpike authority to be an instrumentality of the Commonwealth. Thus, it was either a part of the Commonwealth and immune, or a "quasi corporate agent" instrumentality serves a governmental function in which
case it was probably immune. Spector found the Rader reasoning unsound because Rader
ignored some contemporaneous cases hinting that the Turnpike Commission might be treated
like a railroad. Perhaps the distinction had lain in another difference. Rader sued the Turnpike
Commission. Spector sued both the Commission and the Commonwealth.
78. The commissioner in the fish hatcheries case was obviously not performing a ministerial function when he tried to plan and execute the diversion of a stream. The court, however, enjoined the performance of this ministerial function. In Isett v. Meehan, 232 Pa. 504,
81 at 544 (1911), the court evidently had in mind the unstated distinction between big streams
which could be diverted with discretion and little streams which could only be ministerially
diverted. See also note 52.
79. In Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A.2d 834 (1953), prosecutors were very
"high" and thus immune. Public defenders were not "high" and thus not immune in Reese v.
Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 406 A.2d 735 (1979). Compare Smeltz v. Harrisburg, 440 Pa. 224,
269 A.2d 466 (1979) (policeman) with Dubree v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 567, 303 A.2d 530 (1973) (foreman and bridge workers). In Dubree, the court
admitted that "high" was undefined.
80. Compare Yealy, et al v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862) (township officers) with Burton v.
Fulton, et al, 49 Pa. 151 (1865) school board members).
81. Brigal v. City of Philadelphia, 35 Pa. 451, 19 A. 1038 (1890). Municipal corporation pays damages for a nuisance, a tort to land.
82. Compare, Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 345 Pa. I, 25 A.2d 185 (1942) (proprietary playground) with Simone v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 137, 110 A.2d 431 (1955)
(governmental playground).

(running utilities) are not immune, while other activities (running
schools) are immune. Thus, school property can injure people, but
school people can't. The pattern is haphazard. If the people doing
the injuries have some kind of official immunity, which is likely, the
whole scheme is simply declaring sovereigns win, people lose. 83 That
is not even facially correct in equal protection terms.
However, the suggestion of a lack of equal protection or the
suggestion of unreasonableness of classification is only an argument
which might be entertained by a court. Its legitimacy or chances of
success is, in the final analysis, in the minds of the beholder. The
apparent willingness gleaned from Ayala, now an old case, and Carroll, which is getting old, to knock the whole thing down can not be
trusted. There has been loose talk about equal protection standards
being violated by the new Tort Claims Act, but is just that. The law
is.
The lack of equal protection idea is worth considering, if only as
means of perceiving the law/equity distinction and the relationship
which both of these rubrics bear to the governmental and official
immunity schemes. Since the court never really saw the problem in
most of the old cases and had made no strong reference to it in
Ayala, through Gibson and Carroll, this line of attack is not a terribly fruitful ground to plow. It seems senseless for the courts to be
creating the usual patterns of cases affirming or qualifying the very
narrow meanings of the eight categories of sin for the large sovereign
and the eight categories of sin for the little sovereigns, and endlessly
trying to weave nuances into the immunity pattern. The court, beholding the eight kinds of torts which the sovereign can now commit
under the new statute, will find the unreasonable to be reasonable,
unless it sees the law/equity distinction which commands nonimmunity in tort and contract for all governments. If that were seen,
the distinction would unravel or become unimportant.
4. Other Little Problems.-There are some other problems
with the new Tort Claims Act. Briefly, these are: the subrogation
anomalies which the statute presents; the unique anti-collateral
source rul*e which the statute espouses; and the limitation on liability
parts of the statute. The first of these problems shows us the unwisdom of the statute; the second, its unwisdom and unfairness; and
third, its unconstitutionality, as well as, its unwisdom and unfairness.
a. Subrogation Anomolies.-For no apparent reason, the
83. Even when the people win it, is because of tortured reasoning from ill considered
old cases. See notes 49, 53, 59, 80-82 supra and 94 & 96 infra and the accompanying texts.
The cases cited in those notes were all chances in a lottery with no consistent doctrine, no
rational connection. There are hundreds more.

usual smooth running of the insurance business is clouded in some
areas by this statute. 84 Since eight categories of state, and presumably substate sovereign liability, are narrowly interpreted, an insurer
who takes subrogation rights from an insured in order to proceed
against the tortfeasor will lose the game if, for some reason, the
tortfeasor was a sovereign.85 There is no reason for this, except that
is the way the statute is drafted and narrowly interpreted. Where the
sovereign tortfeasor is insured, it is unnecessary, but not unconstitutional, unless we insist that all legal immunities are improper.
b. The Negation of the Collateral Source Rule.-The collateral source rule is abrogated by the Tort Claims Act. If one assumes
the state to be an immune sovereign which is waiving a bit of its
immunity, the sovereign can theoretically waive a piece of immunity,
or a piece of a piece of immunity, in exchange for a given insurance
policy, by casting into statute form, what we might call, an anticollateral source rule.86 That is what the Tort Claims Act has done.
This creates constitutional problems. The exchange of immunity for
an insurance policy is not for a given policy, but rather for a random
policy which gives the sovereign tortfeasor a better break if he injures a more heavily insured plaintiff. There will be problems in
those cases in which the insurance policy (an accident or auto policy) exceeds the statutory limits of liability. Does that mean that
there is no liability? A further problem arises when there are three
or more people in the same incident injured by a sovereign action or
possession such as a car. Each will have a negligence action against
the sovereign, but some of the car victims will have insurance and
some will not. Perhaps those who had insurance coverage will have
been injured more or less seriously than those who had no such coverage. The operation of the Act could result in making the sovereign
liable to some victims and not to others because of their insurance
policies.
The second problem with the anti-collateral source rule is that it
says, in effect, that the defendant sovereign, (the rule applies only to
local governments and not the Commonwealth) in essence appropriates the insurance coverage of its victim, without compensation and
without paying insurance premiums. This makes little sense. If the
sovereign (big or little) had its own insurance coverage, even less
sense can be made of the anti-collateral source rule. There is something wrong with it. The anti-collateral source rule looks like a tak84. Singer v. Shephard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
85. Wunsch, supra note 42.
86. See PA. STAT. ANN. 855 3(d). This gift is only available to local governments, not
to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

ing of "property" without due process.
Under the federal constitution, however, "property" taken in violation of due process is defined by the state.87 It is not clear that
Pennsylvania has really defined the insurance policy as property because the immunity which can capture the property is not, according
to Mayle, a constitutional mandate. This means that the court can
define "rational" and "property" so as to design a workable set of
immunities around a rational plan. Again, if Pennsylvania was never
deemed a sovereign by its Founding Fathers, then any putative declaration of sovereignty which immunizes against some lawsuits, is
arguably not constitutional.88 Any anti-collateral source rule would
be a taking of property in denial of equal protection because, without
adequate definition, there can be no rational purpose. Thus, lack of
due process becomes lack of equal protection, even in the facially
rational sense. But there really is not much hope for logical arguments. They may please the dilettanti, but they should not succeed.
c. Limitation of Liability in the Statute.-The limitation of
liability section of the statute, on the other hand, offers significant
promise. Article III, section 18 of the Constitution provides that the
General Assembly may enhance, but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit, the amount to be recovered from accidents resulting in injuries to persons or property or death. There is some
earlier law on the subject which suggests that the Tort Claims Act
flies in the teeth, oddly enough, of Article I, section 11 of the Constitution of 1969, as well as violating Article III, section 18 of the same
Constitution. An early case, Boudreau v. Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Street PassengerRailway8 suggests this. In Boudreau, the plaintiff,
riding on the rear of a street car, was injured. He sued the municipal
corporation and recovered a jury verdict of $10,000. There was, however, a statute limiting recovery in such cases to $3,000. The Court
said, "[A] limitation on recovery to a sum less than the actual damages is palpably in conflict with the right to remedy by the due
course of law." 90 Strictissimi juris, a partial waiver of the claimed
sovereign immunity, accompanied by a limitation of damages would
not, quite obviously, run afoul of Article III, section 18, if sovereign
immunity at law is assumed. The argument in favor of the limitation
87.

There is, on the face of it, not a chance that there is a federal due process violation

here. That is because ever since West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1936) it has been
clear that state law defines the "property" which must be taken under federal and state law.
See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1973). However, it is not clear that the interest can be "rationally" defined in view of the
meaning of the constitution (see the equal protection arguments above).
88. See generally, 82 DICK. L. REV. 209 Part 1.
89. 92 Pa. 475 (1880).
90. Id. at 482.

of liability is that the legislature can, if the state is sovereign and
immune, waive only a part of the immunity. However, we have
pointed out already that Pennsylvania is not immune at law, and
thus, the Act is defective under both sections of the state constitution. If the immunity at law did exist, the cause of action is not
eliminated, but merely made less expensive to the sovereign
tortfeasor, a violation of a specific constitutional prohibition. Total
elimination of causes of action against sovereigns (big or little)
would not even be facially correct. Thus, the governmental immunity
portion of the statute fails the constitutional test because of its limitation of liability. The sovereign immunity or Commonwealth portion should fail for the same reason.9 1
Further, if sovereign immunity at law is not constitutionally required, which is what we insist, is there any reason for denying liability in some tort suits and not in others? For immunizing little
sovereigns, as well as big sovereigns, from any but an octagonate of
cases? Since there is ground to strike down the statute, and since it
has no severability clause, the court ought to break it all.
If some questions which have just been raised appear to have
been treated too briefly, or even superficially, it is because we are
discussing the historic constitution rather than the constitutionality
of a statute or of a scheme of equal protection or due process. The
purpose of this article was to review Sovereign Immunity Lesson I,
in view of the new reality.
IV.

Proposal for a New Act

The new Tort Claims Act is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because neither the constitution of 1790 nor the constitution of
1969 mandates complete sovereign immunity. It is also unconstitutional because it rigorously limits Commonwealth liability to certain
kinds of torts, because it creates countless small sovereigns, and because it sets limits on recovery against both the Commonwealth and
the small sovereigns. The Act may violate the right of everyman to
equal protection under the laws as well. The entire Act does not have
a severability clause. A fresh attempt by the legislature might be
more successful if the legislature will observe the distinction between
legal and equitable immunities.
How can one describe the contours of a new statute as it should
be written?
The new statute should cover every subject which the present
statute covers and several more. The statute should bring respondeat
§

91. Compare 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (1980) and 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.
8553 (1980).

superiorinto the law of immunities in detail. The statute should bar
all equitable actions against any sovereign except civil rights actions
and cases in which no adequate legal remedy exists. It should permit
legal actions for damages against all of the sovereigns. Legal actions
must be defined in the Pennsylvania tradition which is now no different from that of the rest of the country. Frivolous claims for damages could be discouraged by requiring the plaintiff to post security
as well as by general awards of attorney's fees to a victorious
sovereign."
If it is constitutional from an equal protection point of view to
immunize a large group of small sovereigns because the scheme is
based upon a rational classification, and if the 1790 words repeated
in the constitution of 1969 now can be read to include small sovereigns, the statute should exclude only those suits aimed at protecting
officials at both levels of state government from judicial interference
with the exercise of their discretionary functions and with the performance of their statutory duties. 93 This is precisely what the writers of the constitution had in mind when they proscribed the
chanceller's interference with the executive in 1790. This principle is
still valid today except in civil rights actions94 and extraordinary
remedies cases. The germ of this truth exists in the present statute.
Policy making and policy execution are the objects of immunity protection, nothing else should be protected by immunity.
It is proper to give blanket immunity to legislators and judges
and proper to provide for indemnification for individuals who act
within the scope of their employment while working for state or local
governments;95 it is equally proper to permit, at any level of government, insurance coverage or self-insurance. If a blanket sovereignty
with immunity exists by legislative fiat, which is denied in both Sovereign Immunity I and here, and the statute merely partially waives
the immunity, it is a close question whether elimination of the collateral source rule would be a "taking" in denial of due process. If it be
a "taking", it is unconstitutional because of Pennsylvania's peculiar
constitutional framework.
92. It is not clear that this is keeping the courts "open" to everyman. It is rational,
however, in a world in which only eight kinds of suits are permitted against each kind of
sovereign. See, 42 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 8351-54 (wrongful use of civil proceedings).
93. The statute refers to "statutorily" based duties of the officers of both the large and
small sovereigns.
94. See, Fisher, 439 A.2d at 1172, supra note 40; and Mansfield State College, 407
A.2d at 1388, also supra note 40.
95. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8524 (Purdon 1982); see generally, Sovereign Immunity Lesson I, text accompanying notes 204-205. The constitutional immunity of the legislator
and the common law immunity of the judge might be called official immunities. These persons
and a Commonwealth agency employee can claim similar immunities. The policy objective is
to restrict suit against any of the three branches in matters of discretionary or policy making
duties.

It is not constitutionally proper to eliminate all lawsuits against
the Commonwealth except for a few categories of tort since "at law"
immunity has never existed. This is truth whether or not there is any
substance to equal protection claims in state law or to due process
claims under any law.
A new act should describe all possible actions against the Commonwealth and should incorporate appropriate acts such as the
Board of Claims Act which have long permitted contract actions to
be pursued against the sovereigns. It should also permit and regulate
non-contract lawsuits without damages limitations.
A new statute should recognize that although "suits" in modern
times can be equated unambiguously to any law or equitable action,
the word "suits" should be given its original 1790 equity meaning.
Thus, the true constitution permits law "actions" against the Commonwealth, including libel suits, 96 but not equity "suits". The original constitution forbade equity suits because of their interference
with discretion, statutory duty, and policy making. The original
drafting purpose is still valid. Civil rights cases and extraordinary
remedy cases, however, should still give everyman an occasional,
valid, equity complaint to accord with modern reality.
A.

Conclusion

Even if sovereign immunity does exist under the constitution of
1969, the legislature has already decided in which courts or agencies,
and in which manner contract cases may be brought against the executive and his employer the Commonwealth. The current Act has
made similar provision for specified tort suits. This empowers the
high court to open up any "at law" immunity, not by substituting its
judgment for that of the legislature but simply because the constitution of 1969 offers no "at law" immunity to the executive branch of
government. This is because the executive, judicial, and legislative
branches are the only actors for the Commonwealth. The legislative
and judicial branches are already immune so Commonwealth immunity must derive from executive immunity. Total executive immunity
has never existed.
The only protection needed by any sovereign, large or small, is
described in the words of the constitution. The constitution establishes that after the government has acted, it may be sued. In 1985,
to sue is to proceed in law or equity. If a sovereign or its employee is
sued today, the current statute properly gives what would have been
96. Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952) appears to be wrong even if
libel is defined as a statement to which truth is not a defense. There should be no privilege for
the attorney general to publish defamatory matter. This case was not cited in Picariello, 421
A.2d at 477, supra note 46.

the governor's defense in 1790 - what we now call official immunity. That defense in 1985, assuming that small sovereigns were not
legitimate in 1790 but are legitimate today, is all the constitution
permits.
The official immunity defense in 1790 certainly would have
been valid in equity actions in which the governor was an immune
party. There is no reason for any sovereign in 1985 not to assume
responsibility in law actions for its officers who were acting within
the scope of their offices. This is, of course, a theory of respondeat
superior. If the small sovereign is a legitimate, twentieth century
sovereign entity, the small sovereign's employee would be personally
immune if acting within the scope of his employment. Nonetheless,
his employer should be liable at law for what the employee has done.
The damage limitation provisions of the Act should be excluded
in a new statute. The limitation on damages protects the little sovereign more than it does the big sovereign and makes no sense. The
insurance benefit section should also be eliminated from a new statute except for a provision that any sovereign can procure insurance
or be a self-insurer. The normal subrogation and collateral source
rules should remain intact because there is no immunity at law
which should give a sovereign these unusual advantages.
Although the courts have incorrectly interpreted the constitution, the legislature has acted to protect the decision making process
of executive officials. If it is legitimate to have a big sovereign and a
number of small sovereigns, then the governmental and official immunity portions of the statute are appropriate as are the portions of
the statute encompassing the issue of respondeat superior. It is reasonable to immunize servants who are carrying out statutory or regulatory duties and exercising discretion in behalf of a governmental
agency. It is likewise reasonable to immunize servants from individual responsibility in certain cases. A total at law immunity, however,
is not constitutionally mandated.
V.

Epilogue

Fragments from several feudal works concerning immunities in
the land of Hope written by an anonymous cleric have been discovered recently9 7 and should be studied by those interested in immunities for their relevance to the modern scene. The first two fragments
seem to be part of either Law, Princes and Immunities8 or from a
97. Tomas La Douteur, believed to be the author of these works, held a joint chair in
law and theology. In his early and middle years, Tomas was a staunch defender of immunities.
His later anti-immunity works were lost after a tragic fire, see infra note 100.
98. The first six chapters of Law, Princes and Immunity were consecrated to proving
syllogistically that divine law, Princes, and Immunity formed a trinity. Although his works

shorter work entitled On Justice and Immunity.99 These fragments
discuss problems which troubled the royal courts of Hope. These
courts were part of a legal system operating much like that of Pennsylvania in 1984.
One fragment concerns three subjects related to immunities: jurisdiction of the royal courts, claims and counterclaims against the
Prince, law and equity claims against the Prince. Another deals with
conditions in Hope. The Prince was said at one time to be immune
from all claims of his people. Parts of both of these fragments discuss the various positions assumed by the courts in that context. The
reader will observe that in Hope there was much confusion in the
immunities area. It was even stated by contemporary writers that
Hope's immunity scheme (before the partial abolition of the immunities) violated the constitution of the Land of the Free of which
Hope was a tiny part.'
In a final fragment containing only a few sentences,'' Tomas
La Douteur, whom we think is the author, states that all of the immunity problems were resolved when the Prince and his Counsel approved a statute which transferred all claims of the People against
the Prince and all claims of the Prince against any of the people to a
great court or board of claims while preserving the Prince's equitable
immunities. We think that a similar solution might accord with the
constitution of 1969. The fragments have been translated from the
original language and may seem crudely written, but they are worth
close study.
"The Prince in Hope protects his subjects in war and better in
peace. He cares for them. He feeds the needy, educates the illiterate,
supports the old, and oversees the welfare of his subjects. He taxes
them as he must. He exacts obedience to his laws. He guards his
subjects against brigands. He is concerned with their detruituit (exhaust fumes). 02 He supervises their hospitals, their commerces and
their guilds. As all good princes have done, our Prince has given the
were considered dull by contemporaries, he was said to be fiery in his lectures on the subject.
He became fierier later in his career. See infra note 101.
99. On Justice and Immunity, written in Tomas' middle period, was said to prove convincingly that if heretics were not damned, they would be immune from fire at the stake. It
also demonstrated historically that no Prince had ever been burned at the stake; hence, all
Princes were immune.
100. The Prince of Hope's external liege lord was the king of the Land of the Free.
101. This final fragment is believed to have come from Tomas La Douteur's last legal
theological treatise, Of Law and Justice. It is all which survives of his massive work on the
subject - said to be his best. Both of Law and Justice and Tomas La Douteur were burned at
the stake after he recanted his approval of sovereign and governmental immunity and published Of Law and Justice. In the surviving fragment La Douteur approved the scheme noted
in the final paragraph of this epilogue.
102. The author has taken the liberty of translating into modern context some of the old
French while leaving the grammatical spelling and syntactical errata of the original text
intact.

use of his parks, forests, streams, rivers, streets and roads which he
keeps, to his subjects. He regulates for their good the guilds of professionals which range from barbers to zookeepers because every
member ....
It would occupy a score of parchments to list the trades, occupations, professions and callings which the Prince regulates and how
he does that . . . All in the land of Hope know that he is, praise
God, a good and able Prince in his regulation . . . Even regulation
dealing with offal (atomic waste products) and light houses -shows
his wise hand as does the operation of the Prince's courts ....
Praise God . . .
By tradition and inclination the Prince has always been loath to
intervene in disputes between his subjects be they serf, freeman or
knight. All such matters are left to the Prince's courts which are
impartial. These courts themselves would make everyman agree,
praise God, upon the wisdom of our Prince...
Long ago, at his urging, the Prince's courts declared that there
was absolutely no distinction in private disputes between knights,
freemen, and serfs, that these were all alike in disputes among themselves and as against their Prince (who was himself immune to suit)
• . . These same courts also declared that the Prince's knight and
foot soldiers were immune as well . . .
In deference to right reason, I am obliged to explain citizenship
in Hope."' 3 In Hope everyone is a serf, all serfs are freemen and any
freeman can become a knight. This includes wenches, ladies in waiting, ladies who refuse to wait, women of the court and otherwise as
well. Serfs who are in business or take up a trade or profession may
be called freemen not serf. A freeman may appear in court before
his Prince as freeman not serf because he has entity status. Of
course, all knights and foot soldiers who work for the Prince are serfs
or freemen as above. The Prince himself is sometimes freeman,
sometimes, when governing, knight, as are his knights and foot
soldiers, but Prince is never a serf.
The Prince himself is really three persons, praise God' 0 4 . . .
He is assembly of wise persons, wise judges of the courts, and Prince
himself as Governor. All of these are serfs or freemen except when
travailing as Princes. The Prince, however, is always Prince. 05
In Hope, however, most of the trouble has been with the knights
103. Some eight pages are missing from the text. In a celebrated work, on Citizenship,
La Douteur describes a society surprisingly like that of Pennsylvania in 1984.
104. La Douteur was a religious man until the time of the fire. See note 101 supra.
105. These obscure passages seem to indicate that in the middle period the courts of
Hope propounded a governmental-proprietary distinction under which the Prince and his employees were sometimes immune, d'office, sometimes not, and, perhaps, except for the Prince
who was never a serf, not immune when acting outside the normal range of their activities.

and foot soldiers who serve the governor. It is the governor and his
knights that I shall call, praise God, "The Prince". This is because
the Prince's liege lord is the King of the Land of the Free, and his
domestic liege lords are the assembly of wise men and the Prince's
own courts. The Prince's courts likewise have two liege lords, these
being, praise God, the Prince himself, and the assembly of wise men,
and some say this wise assembly has only one liege lord, the Prince's
courts; although there are some who say that the wise assembly has
no liege lord at all.
But the Prince, praise God, is the subject of our discourse.
Many years ago a serious problem arose in Hope. The Prince
had been retaining large numbers of knights for his personal retinue.
Since he was a good Prince who wished to be a good master even to
the lowliest of his subjects, and since he wanted to do his work efficiently, he sought to have these numerous knights do his audits, inspections, regulations, and tax collecting. They did so. As his realm
grew in numbers, the knights began to engage subknights and foot
soldiers and even some serfs, and these begat more. Like the old saying in Hope that "knights will be knights", these knights in their
zeal were sometimes mischevious. At the same time the Prince's
Dukes, Counts, and Earls were appointing their own knights and
subknights and each of these had a retinue . . .
The mischief done might be . ...
1) Sometimes the knights would break the close of the serf.
2) Sometimes they might offend a part of the community of
serfs as freemen by under-regulating or under-inspecting or
over-regulating or over-inspecting or by contumaciously or carelessly doing their work - all unfaithfully to their master the
Prince so as to harm many serfs and freemen . ...
4) Sometimes they would lay waste serfs or freemen by not
guarding carefully the Prince's lunatics or animals or overzealous tax collectors.
5) Sometimes they would not pay for things or land seized by
them ...
7) Sometimes they would . . . injure . . . a serf or freeman

through a careless keeping of one of the Prince's buildings,
roads, or parks.
8) Sometimes one of the Prince's soldiers would injure a serf or
freeman.
The people groaned. The Prince wept. But the Prince's business
(praise God) was the Prince's business. The people went to the
Prince's courts which were also the people's courts because People

and Prince were one and the courts said "The Prince is immune. His
knights, subknights, and most of his foot soldiers are also immune.
His Dukes, Counts, Earls, and their cities' and towns' treasuries are
also immune."
The people groaned. Then the court said, "The Prince is immune when he is Princing only." The people wondered what this
strange teaching was and the court spoke again, "The Prince is immune always but perhaps the Prince's servants should not do some of
these things." And again there was much wonder in the Land of
Hope. Then they said again, "The Prince's Dukes, Counts, and Earls
are less immune than the Prince, and their cities and towns are not
immune at all. Then they said, "The Dukes, Counts, and Earls can
do bad things, and perhaps they should not be immune either."
Still the people groaned - and clamored.
Then, all the men of faith in Hope were scandalized when the
Prince's court said "The Prince is a serf and is not immune even
when he is a Prince doing Princing. Thus, we have spoken, but we
are not yet convinced that the Dukes, Earls, Counts, or their knights,
subknights, foot soldiers, and others laboring in the cities and towns
should be treated in the same way . . .but we now think so."
This churlishness angered the Prince as it came from a fellow
liege lord who owed him service and whom he paid from his treasury. It incholered the Dukes, the Counts and the Earls in some
cases as well. The Prince took counsel with his remaining liege lord,
the counsel of Elders. They declared by statute:
The Prince is always immune; the Dukes, Counts, and Earls are
immune very often, but the Prince is not immune when;
1) One of his carriages injures a serf or his property.
2) A serf or his property is injured in one of the Prince's castles
or forts.
3) One of the Prince's medical advisors releases from his charge
a lunatic who injures a serf or his property.
4) One of the Prince's roads or bridges has a defect which injures a serf or his property.
5) The Prince's own personal property injures a serf or his
property.
6) The Prince's vintner injures a serf or his property by vending
bad spirits to a serf.
7) A pothole injures a serf if the Prince's knights know about
the pothole.
8) A serf is injured by one of the Prince's foot soldiers ...
They said in the same law that the cities and towns were immune in almost the same ways as the Prince . . .and they said in
the same law that if a serf were injured by the Prince or his servants,

the Prince would pay 250 soverigns, but if a serf were injured by the
people belonging to the Dukes, Earls, or Counts, the city or village
treasury would pay 500 soverigns. The Prince's courts obeyed. They
said the new statute was just.
The people groaned . . . The courts said again it was very
just, this new law. There was much trouble in the land ....
One day the Prince's Court decided that the Court's own liege
lords (the Prince and Counsel of Wise Men) had not counselled
wisely in their declaration of immunity in some eight cases for the
Prince and eight more for the cities and towns ...
There was scandal in the land of Hope, and, praise God, all
good things . . . . The liege lords in high counsel . . resolved that:
1) Everyman could sue the Prince, Dukes, Earls, or Counts, or
their cities and towns for any injury done him in his lands,
goods, reputation or person, and for engagements broken, limited by the third sentence of this great law.
2) The same groups of courts will listen to all claims of everyman against the Prince, Dukes, Counts, and Earls and listen to
the claims of all those against everyman.
3) However, everyman cannot, except in very special cases, proceed in equity against the Prince, Dukes, Counts or Earls or
against any city or town or village.
4) All Dukes, Counts, Earls, and their cities and towns can proceed against the Prince as in sentences 1-3 above . ...
The serfs, freemen, knights, subknights, soldiers, the Dukes,
Counts, Earls, and even the Prince, praise God, cried "Hosannah,"
as did the cities and towns, but the Prince's courts were not happy
because they were very learned men whose business it was to make
very learned distinctions about the law. The new law, they said, was
devlish simple, inspired by demons . . . In the opinion of your servant . . the great charter posits that this is a just command . ..

